What Conflicts Continues as Russia to Dominate Again

Climbing the ladder: How the Due west can manage escalation in Ukraine and across

Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Table of contents

Introduction

Moscow's invasion of Ukraine is transforming Europe's security architecture, as well every bit NATO'southward strategic priorities and its defense and deterrence posture. Russia's ruthless aggression and NATO'due south response increase the possibility of purposeful or inadvertent escalation in Europe. Whether this takes the form of heightened disharmonize in Ukraine, increased tension beyond the whole or parts of NATO'southward eastern flank—from Ukraine and the Blackness Sea to the Baltic Region and the High N—or in non-kinetic, subthreshold domains, understanding how these dynamics might degrade transatlantic stability is critical. This study will seek to place primal rungs on the escalation ladder effectually the war in Ukraine; assess how the electric current crisis might escalate within Ukraine and across NATO'south eastern flank; explore how the U.s. and NATO posture can preclude or limit escalation; and offering recommendations for how the U.s. and NATO tin can adapt their strategy, posture, and activities to manage escalatory dynamics.

In response to the invasion of Ukraine, the Westward has imposed stinging sanctions, disrupting the Russian economy and forcing the Kremlin to burn through its financial reserves. Major Russian banks accept been disconnected from SWIFT, the international system that facilitates financial transactions, while some oligarchs take been sanctioned. Many allies and partners have provided massive fiscal and textile aid—in the form of funding, besides equally anti-tank and air-defence force systems and other military equipment—to bolster Ukrainian resistance. This assistance has helped to stiffen an already stout Ukrainian defense, which has inflicted heavy losses on the Russian armed forces. Vladimir Putin now faces the real possibility of a stalled offensive, or fifty-fifty outright defeat.

In this circumstance, Russia still has cards to play. Failure in Ukraine places Putin'southward political survival at risk and he is, therefore, unlikely to withdraw. His present difficulties are more probable to provoke escalation within or around Ukraine, both in the military machine realm and in other domains. As he climbs the escalation ladder, Putin's risk tolerance will increase, every bit his central subordinates will surely realize. The ultimate risks, however, are removal from office, imprisonment, or even execution. Accordingly, Putin is far more likely to press harder in Ukraine than to acquiesce to a negotiated settlement that leaves him without tangible gains.

The following word of Russian escalatory options is linked to the progress of the campaign in Ukraine and presents alternating scenarios based on Russian progress or failure and the degree to which the West provides critical support and/or direct intervention. Escalatory steps are described in ascending order of severity and risk. Response options to control or mitigate Russian escalation follow. Information technology is of import to note that Russian, Ukrainian, and Western perspectives or "lenses" on what is escalatory may differ significantly in both fourth dimension and space. This cistron must exist borne in listen when assessing adversary deportment.

Escalation triggers

Every bit Putin and his senior directorate consider options, weather condition on the ground will bulldoze their calculus. Should the Russian military manage to recover its basis and resume progress, however halting, more extreme options may be held in reserve. If the campaign evolves into a "frozen" conflict, similar the Donbas only on a larger scale, Putin'due south focus will shift to destabilizing the Volodymyr Zelenskyy regime in Kyiv and sanctions relief. Should Ukraine achieve decisive success in recovering its national territory, Putin's survival may exist at risk, and incentives to employ harsher and more high-hazard measures will abound. Escalation to each of the below "rungs" will depend on Putin's perception and assessment of how the campaign is progressing and the prospects for ultimate success or failure. Though speculative, likely triggers for escalation into each subsequent phase of the conflict might include

• an assessment that the campaign has stalled temporarily and dissimilar approaches are needed to regain momentum;
• an assessment that the campaign has stalled outright and recovery is unlikely without more extreme measures; and
• an assessment that defeat is imminent, and that Putin may autumn from ability, placing all his options on the table.

Equally the conflict drags on, NATO and European Marriage (EU) actions tin can be decisive one fashion or the other, as described farther beneath.

"Nosotros are already seeing the kickoff round of escalation as Putin comprehends the failure of his initial invasion."

A view shows a residential building destroyed in the course of Ukraine-Russian federation conflict in the southern port metropolis of Mariupol, Ukraine Apr 14, 2022. Picture taken with a drone. REUTERS/Pavel Klimov

The first rung

We are already seeing the first round of escalation as Putin comprehends the failure of his initial invasion. Russian forces have partially or completely encircled key Ukrainian cities like Kharkiv, Mariupol, and others. In the absence of decisive military machine success on the ground, they have resorted to indiscriminate attacks and atrocities in civilian areas to cause terror and suspension Ukraine's will to resist. These measures advise an indifference to international public opinion that may become even more pronounced in the weeks and months to come up. In the near term, further loss of power, food, medicine, and fuel volition impose brutal hardships on the civilian population. Attacks on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear institute, the siege of Mariupol (which has killed thousands of civilians), and attacks on cultural sites like the Babi Yar Holocaust Memorial in Kyiv make articulate that the gloves accept come off.

Every bit evacuation of civilians becomes more than difficult or ceases, the force per unit area on President Zelenskyy to capitulate or agree to harsh terms (such as the surrender of Ukrainian territory, a pledge not to join NATO or the European union, and the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine (as in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova)) will intensify. Russian federation has likewise begun to launch attacks in western Ukraine nearly the Polish border, signaling that further attempts to supply Ukraine with lethal aid will exist opposed. Threats to heighten nuclear alert levels; the motility of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) through the streets of Moscow; the recruitment of Syrian soldiers and strange mercenaries; and the apparent "stop loss" of conscripted soldiers approaching the finish of their contract periods too correspond expansion or escalation of the conflict.

Major powers like China, India, and Brazil accept then far failed to condemn Russia, but are not likely to provide military machine support. The Russia has not employed major cyberattacks, halted energy deliveries or agronomical exports, jailed foreign nationals in big numbers, or defaulted on loans owed to foreign banks. These and many other escalatory options may be encountered equally events unfold and Putin becomes more drastic.

The 2d rung

The latest phase of the conflict will be decided in the coming weeks. Should Kharkiv and Mariupol ultimately autumn in Russia'due south new offensive in the Donbas and surrounding areas, other Russian advances in eastern and southern Ukraine could scroll upwards the Ukrainian defense—potentially all the way to the Dnepr in the nigh devastating scenarios—finer ceding the eastern half of the country to Russian control. A major part of Ukraine'south regular forces will be lost, and the narrative volition shift as Russian offensive gains replace the ascendant storyline of an obstinate Ukrainian defence. Given heavy losses, international condemnation, and crushing sanctions, this may be enough to drive a negotiated settlement: a cessation of Russian attacks in substitution for promises of neutrality and Russian de facto, if not de jure, command of eastern Ukraine. Putin might well claim victory, reconsolidate, piece of work to undermine Zelenskyy'southward government, and hope to install a pro-Moscow authorities as before.

Surging forces and increasing destructive activeness. At nowadays, even so, Ukrainian collapse does non look probable. Should Ukrainian defenses hold in the e, or if Zelenskyy continues to defy Moscow and continue the fight without concessions, Putin volition face more difficult choices. Internal dissent will continue to rise every bit casualties mount and economic hardships and diplomatic isolation intensify. Putin has already committed nigh of his available conventional forces to the disharmonize, and Russian stocks of precision-guided munitions, including ballistic missiles, have been drawn down. His next steps will be to expand conscription, mobilize reserves, strip outlying areas of their garrisons, and increment pressure level on commanders to achieve results by threatening relief, imprisonment, or fifty-fifty execution. Whatever remaining restraints on attacks on civilians volition be relaxed, as seen in Grozny and Aleppo. Artillery, air, and missile strikes confronting cities will intensify, and targeted arrests and assassinations of Ukrainian officials volition become more frequent. Nuclear plants in occupied areas may also be shut downward to kill power in urban areas.

As it did in the Chechen wars, the Russian military will learn from its failures and accommodate its tactics. To date, the integration of airpower, artillery fires, and electronic warfare with maneuver forces has been unimpressive. This will likely improve, though mayhap not dramatically. Damaged forces will exist pulled back to be reconstituted and reequipped, though replacements are probable to be poorly trained. A chaotic command and control structure, with a theater commander to coordinate the twelve regular army and 2 corps headquarters in Ukraine, is under revision. Although a theater commander has been appointed, we do non know if he commands all army formations, or if his authority extends to special-operations forces, airborne forces, naval infantry, the national guard, and other various formations of the Russian Armed Forces and security services. The utilise of "battalion tactical groups" with their own artillery has clearly failed. Reversion to the more traditional regiments, brigades, and divisions may follow, along with a recentralization of field artillery to generate more than powerful effects.

"As Western-provided lethal aid becomes more and more decisive, Putin will stride upward his efforts to interdict ground lines of communication, raising the chances of fires that stray across national boundaries into NATO territory."

Ukrainian service members unpack Javelin anti-tank missiles, delivered by plane equally part of the U.S. armed forces back up package for Ukraine, at the Boryspil International Aerodrome outside Kyiv, Ukraine February 10, 2022. REUTERS/Valentyn Ogirenko

We can expect more than nuclear threats, backed upward past the visible deployment of tactical nuclear systems in the theater of operations. Apply of archaic weapons of mass devastation (WMD), such as chlorine gas, may well begin to increase terror. Every bit Western-provided lethal aid becomes more and more decisive, Putin will stride up his efforts to interdict ground lines of communication, raising the chances of fires that stray across national boundaries into NATO territory. While probably intentional, these may be dismissed as accidental or Western provocations.

Due to naval limitations imposed past the Montreux Convention, Russian maritime forces are dominant in the Black Sea and provide options for signaling, equally well as combat operations. To show resolve and seriousness of intent, Russian commanders there may begin to stop or board commercial vessels at sea, bombard coastal cities, violate territorial waters, interdict coastal motorways and track lines, and land troops in key locations. Major amphibious operations—for instance, to take Odesa—are not likely without cooperation from country forces.

Expanding utilize of nonmilitary measures. In the data domain, Russian federation in this stage is likely to persist in spreading false stories virtually Ukrainian and NATO nuclear, biological, and chemic threats and their intent to "amputate" Russia. These volition have trivial bear upon outside Russia but, given Putin's control of state media, will contribute to domestic back up for the disharmonize. Damaging cyberattacks may exist delivered against targets in Poland, the Baltic States, and perhaps other states providing lethal aid, though catastrophic denial of service, attacks on the fiscal sector or electrical grid, or ransomware attacks confronting the Us may be held in reserve. Propaganda and disinformation directed against President Zelenskyy and his authorities will proceed and intensify, as will attempts to decapitate Ukrainian leadership and regional and local officials through targeted assassinations.

On the economic forepart, Putin retains flexibility through a range of remaining options, though each could either help or hinder his efforts. The about powerful is to finish the sale of oil and natural gas to Cardinal and Eastern Europe (some nations are about completely dependent on Russian energy). Most European allies and partners practice not possess strategic reserves or the necessary infrastructure (e.g., pipelines or terminals and storage tanks for liquified natural gas) to rapidly transition to alternating sources. This stride will surely influence European parliaments and societies, and also deprive Russian federation of badly needed currency reserves.

Though energy is past far Russia'south nearly important export commodity, cutting off shipments to Europe would drive up prices globally, identify severe pressure on European governments, and drive wedges between those states that are dependent on Russian energy and others that are less so. In this phase of the entrada, Putin will probable threaten to cut deliveries or implement modest disruptions to warn targeted nations that continued assistance to Ukraine could issue in harsher steps.

Putin is besides taking initial steps to nationalize assets held by EU and U.s.a. companies in Russia. To appointment, nearly four hundred foreign companies accept moved to divest or wind down their businesses in Russian federation, creating severe pressure level on the Russian economy. Nationalizing those companies' assets volition affect profitability, and may give Putin a temporary public-relations boost domestically. Simply, in the long term, Russia in virtually cases will probably not be able to take over and run these operations successfully.

The Russian authorities may also elect to default on the $56 billion owed to European banks, equally its access to funds deposited away are sequestered and its cash reserves are consumed by crippling sanctions. This default can exist caused past Russia'due south disability to service its foreign debt, or could be a conscious determination by Russian finance officials. While this option carries long-term consequences, such every bit loss of access to strange capital and diminished investor confidence, the global economy will not exist shaken equally it was by the 1998 Russian default. Many foreign investors reduced their exposure following the 2014 sanctions. Though painful, a Russian default now will not be as potent.

Although Russian energy dominates its export market, Russia's agricultural and mineral products are also disquisitional to global prosperity. Russian federation accounts for thirteen per centum of the world'south total fertilizer production, while Russian federation and Ukraine together supply more than 25 percent of the world's full wheat ingather. The fighting in Ukraine has seen Russian forces deliberately target food-storage sites and will affect the spring planting, as many agricultural workers have joined the territorial defense forces. Simply, Russia may also withhold wheat and fertilizer exports, leading to much college prices and a potential global food crisis. This has already begun. Russia is also ane of the world's biggest suppliers of nickel. The invasion of Ukraine created so much uncertainty about supply bondage for nickel that the marketplace presently soared "out of control," generating billions of dollars in losses. Russia is also the world's largest exporter of palladium, a disquisitional material in the manufacture of catalytic converters. Following the invasion of Ukraine and imposition of flight restrictions on Russian carriers, palladium prices reached all-fourth dimension highs in March 2022. Equally with free energy, manipulation of these bolt can serve equally an escalatory pick to existent effect if employed strategically.

The third rung

Should the campaign in Ukraine go on through the spring and into the summertime without a decisive upshot, force per unit area on Putin and the Russian state will intensify. As sanctions bite, Russian casualties mountain, and international back up for Ukraine increases, the prospects for a decisive outcome in Russian federation's favor will wither. Avoiding defeat and the security of the regime will become overriding priorities. Absent a diplomatic solution that can be sold equally a Russian victory worth the sacrifice, Putin will persevere and human activity even more harshly.

Devastating cities to a higher degree. On the war machine forepart, if major Ukrainian urban areas proceed to hold out, the range of bachelor options for Russian forces will begin to shrink. Taking these cities intact by direct assault is unlikely, given the boggling losses already sustained, the low quality demonstrated by Russian conventional forces, and high Ukrainian morale. As lethal help for Ukraine continues to flow, the Russian military will probable fall back on its remaining strengths. Chief among them is a biggy amount of rocket and tubed artillery, and a vast inventory of Cold War-era munitions. More widespread use of thermobaric terror weapons like the 220-milimeter TOS-ane and TOS-2 systems, too as white-phosphorous and napalm weapons, tin can be expected. With these, Russian forces can do more attack cities; they tin level them.

Direct-fire systems can be used in this mode too. After initial failures in Grozny, Russian forces resorted to brute force, using tanks to demolish buildings with loftier-explosive rounds fired in not bad numbers from long range. Field arms was also used in the direct-burn down mode in Chechnya, with devastating results. In this way, lightly armed defenders with handheld anti-tank weapons were destroyed before they could attack Russian tanks. While fighting in cities poses many risks for Russian armor, one advantage is the greater difficulty faced by defenders in employing the top-attack Javelin in urban terrain. Once targeted urban areas take been reduced by devastating long-range fires, opportunities to engage and defeat the stunned and demoralized defenders improve. Demolishing large urban centers to destroy resistance will also affect the volition to resist across Ukraine as a whole.

Redoubling efforts to achieve success in open-field gainsay. As summer approaches and off-road trafficability improves—and after a period of regrouping, retraining, and reorganization—Russian forces will redouble their efforts to encircle the mass of Ukrainian armor and artillery fighting in eastern Ukraine from north and s, an effort already under way. These represent a big part of the Ukrainian "first echelon" order of battle. President Zelenskyy has risked much by exposing these valuable forces to encirclement, only then far the risk has paid off. If they are cutting off and destroyed, the Ukrainian defence in the east volition plummet (except for continued resistance by territorial defense force forces in the cities and insurgency in the countryside). This kind of success volition open the door for diplomatic opportunities, such as an offering of peace and abeyance of hostilities in exchange for a guarantee of Ukrainian neutrality and the "demilitarization" of eastern Ukraine. Annexation of Luhansk and Donetsk volition about certainly follow.

Further cutting lines of communications and supply. At the operational level, Russian commanders in this phase will be seized with the importance of cut ground lines of communication in western Ukraine used to resupply Ukrainian forces and keep the war going. Surprisingly effective Ukrainian air defense has inflicted heavy losses on Russian aircraft, which oftentimes launch their weapons from Belarus or Russian airspace. Aerial and missile fires can be employed against fixed sites like storage or transshipment points, only, now, the Russian army does not have a strong ground presence in western Ukraine. Instead, more than highly trained special-operations units may be used to interdict ground convoys. Every bit the campaign unfolds, sustained strange aid volition mount in importance. As Russian desperation increases, Putin will attempt to indicate that continued use of Polish and Romanian territory to supply Ukraine will have drastic consequences. Painful cyberattacks, covert and deniable intelligence operations, and other hybrid methods may be used for this purpose, including in the Us. In this phase, Putin will not order direct attacks on neighboring NATO countries for fear of bringing the Brotherhood into the war.

Raising the specter of nuclear assail. As the crisis worsens for Russia, the role of nuclear weapons will loom larger. In this stage of escalation, more strident threats to utilise them volition be accompanied by the overt brandish of tactical and strategic systems, publicized "drills," repositioning of nuclear systems, and other activities intended to affright and intimidate. Apply of primitive chemical agents similar chlorine will become more likely if campaign success eludes Russian forces. A demonstration or "examination" using a depression-yield tactical nuclear weapon in a remote area almost the Ukrainian border could occur to add weight to these threats. Russian journalists, academics, and retired military and intelligence officers with contacts in the West will be enlisted to convey a conclusion to escalate farther, if necessary, though such measures will conduct extreme risk.

"Should the campaign in Ukraine go on through the bound and into the summertime without a decisive result, pressure on Putin and the Russian state volition intensify."

The Kyiv TV Tower is hit by Russian federation strike on March 1, 2022 equally Russia'southward invasion Fume rises after military strikes, as Russian federation's attack on Ukraine continues, in Lviv, Ukraine April xviii, 2022. REUTERS/Roman Baluk

Targeting communications infrastructure. So far, Russia has not attempted to close down Ukrainian cellphone usage, partly to preserve telecommunications infrastructure for later on utilize, but also to listen in on Ukrainian communications and to use the network itself. Every bit the prospect of victory recedes, Putin may reassess and determine to destroy cell towers and other facilities to restrict Ukrainian social media and internal communications. This will disrupt Russian intelligence gathering, but also degrade Ukrainian civil and military communications and limit use of social media. However, given the large number of providers in Ukraine, complete loss of coverage or service is unlikely.

Heightening existential rhetoric. As internal opposition begins to organize and stiffen, Putin must strengthen his case for war and continued armed forces action. He will do so by emphasizing manufactured threats to Russian territory, the Russian people (inside and outside Russia's borders), and Russian civilisation. Every bit they have to date, these themes will compete poorly with the reality shown daily around the world in media reporting and social media. Russian disinformation will go on to dilate threats to the Russian homeland and the Russian diaspora to portray the campaign non as a war to "liberate" Ukraine, but as a defense against an existential threat to the survival of the state itself. Putin might enlist the Russian Orthodox Church more than prominently than e'er before in an endeavour to portray the conflict in spiritual, as well as nationalist, terms. The reincorporation of Ukraine, in whole or in part, will now take on the graphic symbol of a crusade.

To appointment, Russian cyber capabilities have been employed largely in direct back up of Russia's military endeavour, for instance, against Ukraine'south military, intelligence, and police communications systems. Now, Putin volition probably unleash comprehensive, full-spectrum cyberattacks confronting Ukrainian government, war machine, financial, and commercial nodes, in add-on to sharp, but not total-scale, offensive cyber activity exterior Ukraine.

Disrupting oil and gas shipments. At this level of escalation, Putin is likely to remind NATO and the Eu of his economic clout by more painfully halting or disrupting oil and natural-gas shipments. This will drive energy prices fifty-fifty college, contribute to power outages or rationing, and inflame opposition parties. Other critical exports may also be halted by government decree. The intent hither is to generate internal domestic pressure level in European capitals to cease or reduce military machine and economical aid to Ukraine, and to create force per unit area for a diplomatic settlement favorable to Russian federation. These moves will be painful inside Russia and represent a calculated take chances—loss of revenue and investor confidence will shock the Russian economy even more harshly—but, at this point, Putin will need game changers to contrary a disastrous and deteriorating situation.

To stave off defeat, Putin must reach a diplomatic settlement that leaves him with more than he possessed at the outset. In all likelihood, this means a pledge of Ukrainian neutrality and the total, not fractional, occupation of Luhansk and Donetsk, their incorporation into the Russian federation, and possession of Mariupol and a land span to Crimea. Well-pregnant leaders in the West will be tempted to concur to these conditions to "finish the killing," merely this outcome can only advantage Russian aggression and lead to more than of the same in future years.

The fourth rung

Consolidating gains. Half dozen months into the campaign, Russia will face one of two outcomes. The first is gradual progress through a combination of mounting Ukrainian losses—both armed forces and civilian—that atomic number 82 to the loss of major urban centers and major groupings of regular forces. Shortages of nutrient, fuel, spare parts, and precision-guided munitions—besides as attrition of major combat systems, such as combat aircraft, main battle tanks, high-altitude air-defence force weapons, and self-propelled artillery—could, in time, wear down Ukraine's defence force if not quickly replaced by friendly states. Grinding compunction and catastrophic destruction of industry, agricultural areas, and infrastructure may then force the Ukrainian government to accept a diplomatic settlement that volition allow Putin to claim victory. Such a settlement could include Ukrainian acceptance of Russian sovereignty over Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, and perhaps Kharkiv and Mariupol, besides as a pledge of permanent neutrality. Putin would also insist on easing of international sanctions as a precondition for a armistice. Despite serious losses and tactical defeats, information technology is too early to count Russia out.

In this example, Putin is likely to consolidate his gains, rebuild and improve his forces, stabilize his internal domestic politics and economy, and effort to reestablish working relationships with Europe—to a higher place all, with Deutschland. Fifty-fifty costly success in Ukraine will not, all the same, satisfy Putin. The invasion of Ukraine should be seen equally another step in an historic process that includes military machine assailment in Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea, and the Donbas, likewise as the deployment of Russian troops in frozen conflicts in Armenia and Moldova. Further aggression in areas formerly belonging to the Russian empire—above all, the Baltic States—is highly likely following a period of reorganization and recovery.

Avoiding a stalemate or defeat through farthermost escalation. The second consequence is a prolonged stalemate or outright defeat. In this scenario, subsequently staggering losses and a scorched-earth campaign throughout Ukraine, Russian forces remain stalled. Ukrainian regular forces have suffered loftier losses but remain largely intact with loftier morale, while territorial defense forces continue to fight finer. Ukrainian performance is actually improving with gainsay experience, likewise every bit growing confidence and elan. Western cloth and fiscal back up remains strong.

Internally, domestic unrest in Russian federation will become a serious threat to Putin's government, every bit crushing economic hardships mount and Russian losses and lack of armed services success become more widely known. Russian oligarchs facing financial ruin—every bit well every bit government, intelligence, and military elites who fear Putin's wrath and land collapse—may act to remove Putin from ability. Force per unit area to resolve the conflict and reassert command may become overwhelming.

"In this scenario, Putin will have to consider more extreme and high-hazard strategies to stave off defeat, prevent economic collapse, divert public stance, and stay in power. Fifty-fifty more success in Ukraine, regime survival volition go the overriding priority."

Russian President Vladimir Putin observes exercise of the strategic deterrence force in Moscow on February 19, 2022. Photo past Aleksey Nikolskyi/Sputnik/Kremlin via REUTERS

Transitioning the conflict in Ukraine into a frozen conflict lasting years, as has been done in the Donbas since 2014, may be Putin's best selection now. A resolute Ukrainian government and highly motivated Ukrainian forces will go on to fight to reassert sovereignty over the national territory. Continued Western support will enable Ukrainian forces to grow stronger, though it may not be possible to retake the areas newly controlled past Russian federation without more armor and combat aircraft. In this scenario, Putin volition take to consider more than farthermost and high-risk strategies to stave off defeat, forestall economical collapse, divert public stance, and stay in power. Even more than success in Ukraine, regime survival will become the overriding priority.

With this in heed, what escalatory options could Putin choose?

Employing cyber tools. Under such desperate circumstances, Putin may elect to employ the full scope of his offensive cyber capabilities, which are formidable. Repeatedly in recent years, Russian cyber weapons have been employed successfully. While Russian federation has employed its cyber tools at the tactical level to some success in Ukraine, for reasons that remain somewhat unclear, the potential strategic effects of these weapons accept been held in reserve then far in the campaign. Potential targets could include critical infrastructure such every bit power and transportation grids, nuclear-power plants, healthcare systems, regime operations, the financial sector, and military machine command and control in the Us and Europe. These attacks would certainly invite retaliation, but Putin may see them every bit warranted to stave off defeat and preserve his regime.

Employing WMD. Putin may also choose to resort to weapons of mass destruction to moo-cow the Ukrainian public and frighten off Western back up. This could take the form of chemical strikes using military-grade chemic agents, such as nerve or mustard gas (although a signatory to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, Russia is known to retain substantial stocks). Russia has already accused Ukraine and the United States of establishing chemical- and biological-weapons facilities inside Ukraine, a likely precursor to its own use. Russian formations field organic nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protection units at all levels, from brigade to combined-arms regular army, and Russian planners will surely contemplate using them if faced with a humiliating defeat.

Employing nuclear weapons. Use of tactical nuclear weapons inside Ukraine is as well a possibility in a final bid to achieve military success, although senior Russian military officials may cramp at such an extraordinarily risky stride. As NATO's nuclear umbrella does not extend over Ukraine, Putin may discount the take chances of retaliation. An added benefit could exist a sharp warning of Russia's willingness to use nuclear weapons if provoked—for case, if NATO ultimately entered the conflict to salvage a foundering Ukraine. This option would take the form of low-yield tactical weapons, launched from aircraft or field arms, or delivered via Iskander-M short-ranged ballistic missiles or Kalibr cruise missiles. Such use would not necessarily lead to uncontrolled escalation, and is well within the calculus of Russian military doctrine. The shock of such an consequence would be profound, and could lead to Ukraine's submission or acceptance of unfavorable terms. Similarly, Russian forces could engineer a nuclear "blow" involving one or more of Ukraine's fifteen reactors, located at Yuzhnukraines, Rivne, Khmelnitsky, and Zaporizhzhia. (Chernobyl, located i hundred kilometers north of Kyiv, is non operational, merely notwithstanding houses big amounts of radioactive textile.) The spread of radioactive fallout would, however, be very weather dependent, making this a very high-run a risk venture. Unquestionably, Russian federation would be condemned even by its few remaining supporters, to say zippo of an aroused and aroused international community. At this phase, Russia is already an international pariah, with little moral currency left to lose. Ordering the use of tactical nuclear weapons could well be game changing. It might also bulldoze Putin from power.

Destabilizing areas exterior Ukraine. On the diplomatic and intelligence fronts, other possibilities too be. The Russian authorities could further interfere in Transnistria or addendum South Ossetia and Abkhazia, further complicating regional stability. Hostage taking—the abort and detention of diplomats, journalists, business concern executives, missionaries, and other foreign nationals—would provide real leverage and help to extract concessions. Targeted, not-attributed assassinations in foreign countries are well within Russian capabilities, and could sow confusion and assistance to destabilize opponents.

Russian information operations, and then vaunted before the invasion of Ukraine, volition exist of express utilise now. Russian credibility abroad is so low, and the evidence of Russian atrocities so overwhelming, that imitation-flag operations, fake news, doctored videos, and tortured narratives will not gain traction outside Russia and, over fourth dimension, might be more and more than discounted inside. Similarly, few economic, fiscal, or commercial options will be in one case exports of disquisitional commodities take been close off. An unintended consequence volition exist the development of alternate sources of supply for European and global customers, much as Corking Britain and France plant other suppliers for cotton wool during the Civil War once southern shipments were embargoed. Loss of international credit, the collapse of the ruble, exhaustion of fiscal reserves, and lack of admission to capital held outside Russia volition encounter Russia approaching economic collapse.

In curt, while these more than extreme escalatory options deserve consideration, most would leave Russian federation in even worse shape and at greater risk. Russian elites almost certainly run into this. The more moderate and sensible arroyo—to withdraw to pre-state of war boundaries, offer concessions to Ukraine and the West, and open Russia to economical integration and improved relations with the international community—is highly improbable equally long as Putin remains in power. The almost likely issue is that Putin will keep to escalate until he is defeated outright, removed from power, or offered concessions he tin have as victory.

The take chances of horizontal escalation

Though information technology presents incredibly high risk, escalating the conflict across Ukraine's borders in the near term is an selection Putin could consider if his survival is at stake. A direct assail on NATO territory—perhaps through Republic of lithuania to obtain a land corridor to the Kaliningrad exclave and cut off the Baltic States, should Russian forces notice more success in Ukraine—is possible. The powerful Kaliningrad garrison, which includes nuclear-tipped Iskander-One thousand and Kalibr systems, could aid. At sea, a desperate Russian Federation might attack and seize commercial shipping in international waters on the Blackness Sea and in the Baltic. Broadening the conflict to engage outside powers more than directly might stop the flow of back up and lethal help to Ukraine, throw NATO into disarray, create openings for sanctions relief, and rally an increasingly disaffected Russian population. If tactical nuclear weapons are postured for use, or employed in agony, the risks of uncontrolled escalation will go quite real. Such use is not likely, simply cannot be ruled out.

Other military options also exist. Belarus has a substantial basis force of four heavy brigades, an airborne brigade, and strong arms, which remain uncommitted. Putin could, in result, take over and deploy this forcefulness in Ukraine or the Baltics, though its morale appears low. To distract and punish NATO for its support, hybrid operations in the Baltic States using Russian mercenaries, special-operations troops and intelligence paramilitaries from the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) could seize ethnically Russian parts of NATO territory (for example, in the Narva surface area in Estonia) and declare independence. While substantial Russian regular forces are not available in forcefulness, this move would provoke frantic diplomatic activity in NATO and the EU, and could provide leverage for negotiations and sanctions relief.

Horizontal escalation in other regions—such as the Arctic, the Mediterranean, and the Far East—is as well possible, but would suffer from the same inability: lack of military machine resources to achieve any decisive result. To date, Russian naval forces are intact and could be employed, but the Russian navy is not a true bluish-water maritime strength and, apart from nuisance attacks, could not realistically alter strategic outcomes. The same is true of Russian war machine aviation and infinite forces. Apart from generating confusion and a degree of misdirection, it is unlikely that these operations could contribute significantly to the success of the entrada in Ukraine, Putin's primary goal. On the reverse, such operations could bring other military powers into the disharmonize against Russia, amerce others such equally Prc and Bharat, and change the correlation of forces decisively against Russia.

"If Putin achieves a measure of success in Ukraine, however, horizontal escalation in the side by side 3–five years is more than likely."

A US RC-135U flying in international airspace over the Baltic Sea was intercepted past a Russian SU-27 Flanker June 19, 2017. Due to the high rate of closure speed and poor control of the aircraft during the intercept, this interaction was determined to be dangerous. (Courtesy photo/Released)

If Putin achieves a mensurate of success in Ukraine, however, horizontal escalation in the side by side 3–5 years is more likely. Should the Due west decide not to provide offensive weapons or intervene directly, Putin tin achieve a negotiated settlement, leaving Russia in possession of the Donbas, Crimea, and perhaps Mariupol, along with a pledge of Ukrainian neutrality. In this case, Putin would gain time to shore up his authorities, rebuild his forces and economic system, attempt yet again to develop a pro-Moscow regime in Kyiv, and pursue sanctions relief. Russian leaders will be mindful that, despite the devastation inflicted on Ukraine and concessions forced on information technology, Western leaders were not willing to confront Russia directly. The West will be seen as risk balky and subject to further rounds of intimidation. Hybrid approaches, with heavy emphasis on propaganda, subversion, disinformation and cyber operations, will figure prominently here.

Preventing and controlling escalation

What tin can NATO and the European Union do to forbid Russia from escalating the conflict to unacceptable levels? What follows are a few principles to guide NATO's cess of preventing and avoiding escalation.

Keep Ukraine in the fight. The get-go, and almost immediate, curative is to proceed Ukraine in the war. This means connected fiscal assistance, shipments of lethal assistance, and real-time intelligence sharing, as well as humanitarian assistance and help with absorption and resettlement of refugees. The U.s.a. and Europe have shown unity and concerted action in responding swiftly to Russian assailment in Ukraine and this must continue, fifty-fifty as Putin seeks to discover and bulldoze wedges betwixt transatlantic allies and partners. In this struggle, a coherent narrative, shared and articulated in common, will be critical.

In this regard, continuous references to the danger of escalation to "World State of war III" and a steady drumbeat of measures not to be taken can only serve to reassure Putin that he has a costless manus in Ukraine. A caste of strategic ambiguity and the possibility of Usa and NATO intervention should he get too far can be helpful in moderating Russian excesses and controlling escalation. An "all measures on the table" arroyo volition force Russian planners to consider, and fix for, multiple response scenarios, complicating resource allocation and inducing uncertainty. While deterrence is more art than science, signaling to one'southward opponent that one is besides frightened to engage is more than likely to encourage than to deter.

The most effective way to preclude spillover onto NATO territory and other forms of future Russian aggression is to help defeat Russian forces in the field inside Ukraine. Supplying Ukraine with food, fuel, spare parts, and modern equipment is the all-time way to do that, while still avoiding direct intervention past NATO. This means combat aircraft, main boxing tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled and rocket arms, mobile air defence force, secure radios, unmanned aeriform vehicles, target-acquisition radars, spare parts, and ammunition, including precision-guided munitions. Many of these combat systems exist in storage in great numbers in the Us and in Europe. The Ukrainian military has shown remarkable versatility in adapting to unfamiliar systems such every bit the Javelin and Stinger, but exportable training packages, and even training sites in Europe for selected specialists, besides warrant consideration.

If NATO intervenes, exercise it decisively. Several European nations, including Poland, Denmark, and Belgium, are considering some form of "peacekeeping" intervention in Ukraine, while calls for a no-fly zone are mounting as the noncombatant death cost rises. This suggests a critical mass of back up may be forming for outside intervention under certain circumstances. Strong material and financial assistance may enable Ukraine to concur on, and even advance to retake occupied territory, simply Russia remains a far larger and stronger opponent. If the logic that information technology is improve to defeat Putin in Ukraine than on NATO territory is audio, intervention to prevent the fall of Ukraine or its dismemberment must be considered. The prospect of actual genocide of Ukrainian civilians, or employ of weapons of mass destruction, might likewise trigger NATO intervention.

This can take several forms. A no-wing zone would mean that NATO, or a coalition of the willing, employs combat shipping based outside Ukraine to ground Russian military aviation, leaving ground combat to the Ukrainians (an analogy is the Kosovo air campaign). Unified command and control would be essential. The try would neglect if all targets required approval past xxx nations, so allowing discretion to military commanders interim within political guidance would be required. All Russian aircraft entering Ukrainian airspace would be engaged. Russian air defenses must exist suppressed (perhaps even inside Russian federation), frontward air controllers must be embedded with footing units to forestall fratricide, and target lists may be expanded quickly to include attack of Russian missile and rocket systems that are destroying Ukrainian cities.

A no-wing zone is, of course, an escalation itself, merely one intended to lead to a Russian defeat in Ukraine to prevent follow-on assailment in Europe. Entering the conflict from the air is a serious and sober footstep. Some aircrew would be lost. Putin could retaliate by launching ballistic missiles confronting Polish, Romanian, or other European targets. To do so, even so, would mean expanding the conflict against a much stronger and wealthier NATO, at a betoken at which almost all of Russia'due south available combat ability is deployed in Ukraine. Intervention from the air also provides a clear firebreak. Introduction of big NATO ground forces would be an even more than dramatic step Russian federation would surely seek to avert if possible.

Introduction of "peacekeeping forces" or establishing a "humanitarian no-conflict zone" in western Ukraine, employ of NATO special forces and trainers, and deployment of "niche" specialists with critical skills such as communications, targeting, and computer-network defense are also forms of intervention that could contribute to success in Ukraine. Different air operations, however, these could make only marginal contributions that may not be worth the added risk of bringing the Brotherhood into the state of war. Should the campaign mature, and a no-fly zone materialize, these additional measures could augment Ukraine's defense in helpful ways, only they should non precede air intervention. Direct intervention is a major step. It should not be undertaken except to reach a decisive result.

Bolster forward presence. As a hedge against further Russian aggression and to reassure allies, the US deployed ii additional heavy brigades to Poland in Feb and early March, forth with an airborne brigade, bringing the Usa rotational "heel-to-toe" brigade there to divisional strength. Usa divisional and corps-level headquarters were also sent. The United states second Cavalry Regiment based in Frg (actually a Stryker brigade) was relocated to Romania at the same fourth dimension. Additional air units and footing troops from a number of allies take too been deployed to NATO's eastern flank, while the forty-chiliad-soldier NATO Response Forcefulness (NRF) has been alerted for the showtime fourth dimension in its history.

Putin's rhetoric and aggressive disinformation and subversion efforts have, for years, targeted the Baltic States, which stand up between Kaliningrad and face-to-face Russia and extend well-nigh to the suburbs of St. Petersburg. To forestall future aggression and cement business firm deterrence, these forces should remain in eastern Europe at least for the virtually term (i.e., iii–5 years). As the campaign in Ukraine unfolds, Putin should sympathise clearly that NATO is postured to answer strongly to further escalation.

"Putin'southward threats were intended to go on his neighbors weak, but recent events have proven that information technology is the perception of weakness, non strength, that provokes him virtually."

The 51st Commando Battalion Romanaian Special Forces run to an HH-60G Pave Hawk, assigned to the 56th Rescue Squadron, in Romania March, 9, 2022. (U.S. Air Force Photo by Senior Airman Noah Sudolcan)

For many years, policymakers have argued strenuously against providing the Baltic States, and NATO'southward eastern flank in general, with an adequate defense for fear of "provoking" Russia and to "maintain Brotherhood unity." Measures to build upwards Ukraine's defensive capacity were resisted for the same reasons; the Barack Obama administration opposed lethal help, fifty-fifty afterwards the invasions of Crimea and the Donbas, while the Donald Trump assistants provided but a trickle. The invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the pitfalls of this thinking. Putin's threats were intended to keep his neighbors weak, only recent events have proven that information technology is the perception of weakness, not strength, that provokes him most. Accordingly, a firm defense from the borders of Finnmark to the Black Sea tin prevent spillover or regional escalation, communicate resolve, and reassure host-nation publics that the conflict in Ukraine volition not land on their doorstep. This is under style with the contempo announcement that NATO battlegroups will be posted in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia. Meanwhile, Germany, the U.k. (UK), Denmark, and others accept also pledged to increase their forces in the Baltic States.

To further strengthen deterrence and head off escalation, NATO should thoughtfully consider how best to help the Baltic States assistance themselves. Though proud members of the 2-percent club, their small-scale economies prevent them from acquiring the air defense and heavy forces they need to deter future Russian aggression. Estonia and Latvia field only a single light brigade each, while Lithuania fields a mechanized brigade with no tanks and a motorized brigade. Using security-assistance funds (such equally the European Deterrence Initiative), the Usa and NATO could equip existing Baltic formations with modern tanks, self-propelled artillery, and air defense from reserve stocks, forth with the training, spare parts, and ammunition needed to make them feasible. The Alliance should also strengthen the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) formations in the Baltic States, equally Secretarial assistant General Jens Stoltenberg has suggested. These forces are too small to pose a credible offensive threat, simply can defend long plenty for other NATO forces, such as the NRF and U.s.a. armored units in Poland, to move up to assist.

In the maritime domain, NATO's naval forcefulness clearly outmatches Russian federation's, merely operations in confined waters like the Baltic or Black Seas are complicated by land-based air and missile threats, equally well as sea mines. Russian anti-ship missiles likewise outrange NATO'southward. Should Russian naval forces begin to set on commercial shipping in international waters, NATO tin respond with standoff weapons, but should practise caution inside range of land-based systems until they are suppressed. If Turkey agrees, stronger NATO naval forces should enter the Blackness Sea to provide flexible response options to counter Russian maritime aggression.

Take an unambiguous stance on nuclear policy. To salve the threat of a Russian offset-employ nuclear strike and regain liberty of action, the United States and NATO must return to core deterrence principles. As it has for many decades, nuclear deterrence rests on both capability and credibility. NATO nuclear forces, though much reduced since the Cold War (especially with respect to theater nuclear systems) are redundant, survivable, and absolutely capable of destroying Russia from end to terminate. NATO'due south brownie, on the other mitt, is constantly undermined when leaders publicly limited palpable fears that Putin will employ his nuclear arsenal, for unclear reasons and in unclear means, and that they must at all costs avert pushing him into a corner. A resolve non to be bullied is essential. Deterrence works all-time when leaders are direct, unambiguous, resolute, and at-home, as John Kennedy was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. As President Emmanuel Macron reminded his public recently, the West has nuclear weapons, too.

Use economic tools equally a primary "offensive" weapon. As the military campaign progresses, sanctions volition continue to strangle the Russian economy. This force per unit area must continue—and, if possible, intensify—in lodge to force Russia, non just to the negotiating table, but to withdraw altogether from Ukrainian territory. To appointment, not all Russian banks accept been banned from SWIFT, and many oligarchs remain unsanctioned. Though painful and difficult, weaning Europe from Russian energy, divesting from Russian businesses, and closing European markets are powerful weapons the EU can wield in its own right. (While 37 percent of Russian trade is with Europe, just 4 percentage of the EU's goods exports go to Russia.) Today, Russian energy remains exempt from European union sanctions. Developing alternate sources of energy, in detail, will take time and investment, but connected reliance on Russian oil and natural gas can only enable Putin to go on to finance the war in Ukraine.

In March 2022, the EU imposed its fourth tranche of trade sanctions on Russia, tightening export restrictions on dual-utilize technologies, expanding the list of sanctioned persons related to defense industries; imposing further trade restrictions for steel, iron, and luxury goods; and prohibiting transactions with specific country-endemic enterprises. The challenge now will exist to maintain the total range of sanctions until they bear fruit. Global food shortages, rising energy prices, and scarcities among certain commodities will challenge the sanctions regime. Much depends on the persistence and resolve of Western leaders.

Properly understood, comprehensive economic sanctions against Russia—what the French finance minister has called "total economic and fiscal war on Russia"—can be a major tool, denying Putin the financial resources to deport on the war and generating internal pressures on elites that could lead to his removal. By themselves, however, they will probably non end the war. China, Brazil, and India remain open markets and suppliers, if not active supporters, while Hungary and Serbia retain close ties. As former Deputy National Security Adviser General Rick Waddell has pointed out to the writer, "An economy that is self-sufficient in free energy and food takes a lot of killing." In concert with diplomacy, ambitious information operations, and the military musical instrument of power, sanctions tin be a vital component of an overall strategy to command and limit escalation and drive conflict termination by draining Russia of the fiscal resources information technology needs to carry on the war.

Set up for the most likely area of escalation: net. As events progressively turn against Putin, the prospect of cyber war volition loom always larger, as it represents one of Russia's nigh powerful remaining weapons. Few Western nations possess true offensive cyber capabilities, and the United States alone possesses the ability to deter major cyberattacks by delivering constructive and large-scale reprisals. President Joe Biden has issued clear warnings to the individual sector to harden its cyber defenses, which remain patchy and incomplete, and put Putin on notice that cyber assaults on critical infrastructure, the financial sector, and other key targets will be met with severe retaliation. A complicating factor is that cyber warfare on a strategic scale has never occurred, and much remains unknown almost information technology. For example, attacks on critical Russian infrastructure, such as power grids and transportation networks, could unintentionally cause civilian deaths, while intrusion into military machine command-and-control nodes could alarm the commanders of Russia's nuclear forces. In many respects, the cyber domain remains the realm of the unknown. Like aeriform warfare in the early on twentieth century, both sides must grope frontward and acquire equally they become. A strong and clearly articulated cyber-deterrence regime, punctuated by sharp demonstrations if necessary, is the best defence force here.

Maintain unity on the diplomatic front end. In the midst of aggressive warfare, diplomacy may not capture the headlines. But, it must remain in play, above all considering political objectives in the cease must govern what happens on the battleground. Hither in that location are minefields. NATO and the Eu may be tempted to intervene in negotiations and offer solutions—"off ramps" is au courant—to more than chop-chop achieve a cessation of hostilities. These could take the form of sanctions relief and acknowledgement of Russian sovereignty over parts of Ukraine in exchange for "peace." This would be a fatal error.

Practitioners of realpolitik may minimize Zelenskyy's emphasis on shared values and the ongoing contest betwixt republic and autocracy, but his denizens and millions in Europe and the Us won't. Despite the leverage the Westward has over Ukraine as its storehouse and quartermaster, the Ukrainian people will decide "how this ends." The political endgame—the definition of "victory"—must reflect outcomes they deem worthy of the enormous sacrifices they have made. The trap here is that Putin will not give up his aspirations if allowed to keep some of his gains, restore his finances, rebuild his forces, and try over again.

The West has an opportunity to rule out that future altogether. That outcome rests on continued force per unit area, assistance to Ukraine, a resolute and united front, and the willingness to face Russia decisively should Putin aggrandize the conflict. Western diplomacy must be based on more than "stopping the fighting." The United states and its allies must see through and beyond the endgame to a stable and lasting peace. That means the comprehensive defeat of the Russian military in Ukraine, before the conflict metastasizes farther and spreads into Europe and beyond.

Throughout, diplomacy should leverage the stiff, worldwide opposition to Russian aggression—as expressed in the United nations Full general Assembly's overwhelming vote of March 2—in all international forums. Traditional neutrals such as Sweden, Republic of finland, and Republic of austria have joined in strongly condemning Putin's deportment and take a growing phonation. Edifice and sustaining this coalition should remain a top diplomatic priority.

"Western diplomacy must exist based on more than "stopping the fighting." The U.s.a. and its allies must come across through and beyond the endgame to a stable and lasting peace."

Left to right: US President Joe Biden with President Emmanuel Macron (France) and Boris Johnson (UK Prime number Minister)

Summary recommendations

The result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine is still uncertain. Much depends on a resolute response from the West. All courses of action carry risk, only the greatest risk is a settlement that leaves Putin with substantial gains and poised to commit further aggression afterward a period of retrenchment and recovery. To prevent this consequence and every bit laid out in more detail above, NATO and Eu members should

• hold on the defeat of Russia in Ukraine every bit the desired finish state, vice a negotiated settlement that dismembers the Ukrainian state and allows Putin to claim success;
• step up lethal assistance to Ukraine, including the means to conduct offensive operations to recover occupied territory;
• consider straight intervention if necessary to foreclose massive civilian casualties or apply of WMD;
• maintain the presence of recent reinforcements on NATO's eastern flank for the near term (iii–five years);
• assistance the Baltic States to strengthen their defense establishments with armor, air defense, and cocky-propelled arms;
• conduct recurring exercises from Finnmark to the Black Sea to enhance interoperability and forward presence;
• strengthen tactical nuclear systems in Europe to raise deterrence;
• coordinate with Turkey for a stronger naval presence in the Black Ocean;
• sustain comprehensive economic sanctions until the desired terminate state is achieved;
• implement a coordinated information entrada with a consistent and focused narrative;
• harden figurer-network defenses;
• be prepared to conduct offensive cyber operations if required;
• provide economic assistance and humanitarian relief;
• reduce and eliminate dependence on Russian energy and rebuild energy security; and
• carry a sustained diplomatic effort, leveraging international organizations, to generate and maintain global pressure level against Russia.

Conclusion

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the most dangerous issue to occur in Europe since the end of the Second Earth War. In its potential for enormous casualties, devastation on an epic scale, and escalation to unthinkable extremes, it demands the attention and considered action of NATO, the European Union, and the whole earth. No ane tin can see clearly exactly how the crisis will play out. This "strange voyage," in Winston Churchill's words, is a journeying into the unknown, as all wars are. The best the Westward can do is ready for the worst, continue its nervus, and employ all its resources when its vital interests and most cherished values are attacked. Things are very close to that stage now. At stake is an international club founded on something other than brute force, royal ambition, and autocratic self-assist. A Russian victory in Ukraine, fifty-fifty at great cost, places a vengeful Putin on Europe'south doorstep, his ambitions partially achieved but still unrealized. The next blow volition fall on NATO's eastern flank. At present is the time to ensure that never happens.

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Image: A service fellow member of pro-Russian troops in a uniform without insignia drives an armoured vehicle in the separatist-controlled village of Bugas during Ukraine-Russia conflict in the Donetsk region, Ukraine March vi, 2022. REUTERS/Alexander Ermochenko TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY

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Source: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/managing-escalation-in-ukraine/

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